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PRIVATE RELIEF UNDER THE 
REFUSE ACT 
By H award ]. Lazarus· 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent efforts to enjoin violations of the federal Refuse Act,1 
which regulates discharges into navigable waters, have met with 
only limited success. While the federal courts have granted injunc-
tive relief to the federal government,2 similar relief to private 
parties has been denied3 for a variety of reasons. 
This article will discuss the problems facing private parties who, 
by way of the Act, seek injunctions against unauthorized discharges 
into navigable waterways. As will be seen, these problems are 
tripartite, relating to: the purpose and scope of the Act, the reme-
dies generally available under the Act, and the standing of private 
persons to litigate with respect to violations of the Act. 
THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ACT 
The Refuse Act is the popular name for section 13 of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899.4 To fully understand the purpose and 
scope of the Refuse Act, it is necessary to examine it in relation to 
the other provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act. The latter 
Act, based on the interstate commerce clause,5 applies to all naviga-
ble waters.6 The test for navigability, as set out by the United 
States Supreme Court, is: 
whether the river, in its natural state, is used, or capable of being 
used as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel is or 
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on 
water. Navigability in the sense of the law, is not destroyed because 
the watercourse is interrupted by occasional natural obstructions 
or portages; nor need the navigation be open at all seasons of the 
year, or at all stages of the water.7 
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Current regulations of the Army Corps of Engineers adopt this 
test; they add, moreover: 
To appraise the evidence of navigability on the natural condition 
only of the waterway is erroneous . . . A waterway is not barred 
from that classification merely because artificial aids must make the 
highway suitable for use before commercial navigation may be 
undertaken.8 
It should be recognized then that this test is a broad one, allowing 
for determinations of navigability where waterways are not, in fact, 
currently suitable for use in interstate commerce. The Rivers and 
Harbors Act, and specifically section 13, may therefore apply to a 
vast number of waterways in the United States. Of course, all 
determinations of navigability are ultimately made by the courts.9 
The Rivers and Harbors Act contains several provisions regulat-
ing a broad range of obstructions in navigable waters.10 Section 911 
of the Act requires the consent of Congress and approval of the 
Chief of Engineers prior to construction of any bridge, dam, or 
causeway, over or in any navigable waterway. Section 1012 makes 
unlawful the creation of any obstruction to a navigable waterway, 
unless there is Congressional authorization therefor. This section 
also prohibits commencement of any excavation or fill project that 
may have the effect of altering or modifying the course or naviga-
bility of any waterway, unless there is prior approval by the Secre-
tary of the Army. Section 1413 prohibits activities that may impair 
the operation of any federal public works project involving a navi-
gable waterway. Section 1514 makes it unlawful to tie up or anchor 
a vessel in a manner that interferes with the passage of the other 
vessels. 
Section 13, the so-called "Refuse Act"15 is perhaps the most 
important provision of the Rivers and Harbors Act. It prohibits all 
discharges into navigable waterways, except liquid discharges flow-
ing from streets and sewers; this exception, it should be noted, 
has been strictly limited to discharges of "sewage."16 The section 
also makes unlawful the placing of any material on the bank of a 
navigable waterway in such a manner as to make it likely that the 
material will be washed· into the waterway and thereby impede 
navigation. Section 13 further provides that the Secretary of the 
Army and the Chief of Engineers may grant permits for discharges 
into waterways if such discharges will not cause injury to naviga-
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tion or anchorage. However, the section requires that any applica-
tion for a permit be made prior to actual discharge. 
The Rivers and Harbors Act was a compilation of already exist-
ing laws that related to navigable watersP Section 13 itself is based 
upon several pre-existing statutes.1S A section of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1886/9 re-enacted separately in 1888,20 applied 
only to New York Harbor, and made unlawful the discharges of 
many types of material, such as "refuse, dirt, ashes, cinders, mud, 
sand dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other matter of any kind .... "21 
The Rivers and Harbors -Act of 1890,22 dealing with all navigable 
waterways, and not just New York's, had a less extensive prohibi-
tion. It made unlawful only those discharges of waste "which shall 
tend to impede or obstruct navigation."23 The Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1894 prohibited all discharges of matter of an:v kind.24 Al-
though this Act did not include any express requirement that the 
discharge impede or obstruct navigation, its legislative history,25 
as well as its administrative interpretation,26 suggest that Congress 
did intend this Act to be so limited. 
The current "Refuse Act" became law with the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899, and in its present form it provides: 
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge or deposit, or cause, suffer, 
or procure to be thrown, discharged or deposited either from or out 
of any ship, barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the 
shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, 
any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than 
that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a 
liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States, or into 
any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall 
float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be 
lawful to deposit, or cause, suffer or procure to be deposited material 
of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water, or on 
the bank of any tributary of any navigable water or where the same 
shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by 
ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby 
navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed: Provided, That 
nothing herein contained shall extend to, apply to, or prohibit the 
operations in connection with the improvement of navigable waters 
or construction of public works, considered necessary and proper by 
the United States officers supervising such improvement or public 
work: And provided further, That the Secretary of the Army when-
ever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and navi-
gation will not be injured thereby, may permit the deposit of any 
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material above mentioned in navigable waters within limits to be 
defined and under conditions to be prescribed by him, provided 
application is made to him prior to depositing such material; and 
whenever any permit is so granted the conditions thereof shall be 
strictly complied with, and any violation thereof shall be unlawfu1.27 
(emphasis added). 
On its face, the first part of section 13 (that before the first semi-
colon) appears to prohibit all discharges into navigable waterways. 
In other words, it can be argued that any discharge made without 
a permit, whether or not tending to interfere with navigation, 
would be unlawful. There is judicial support for this reading of 
section 13. 
In United States v. Ballard Oil CO.,28 decided in 1952, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the phrase 
"whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed" limits 
only the second part of section thirteen (that after the first semi-
colon and before the "Provided" clause, and dealing with the place-
ment of materials on riverbanks). The case was decided in summary 
fashion with no citation to authorities. The district court had 
found Ballard guilty of violating section 13 because its activities, 
discharging refuse without a permit, had impeded navigation. On 
appeal, the circuit court stated that Ballard had not violated the 
second part of section 12, as it had not deposited any materials on a 
riverbank; there was no breach of the second part even though 
Ballard had, without a permit and in contravention of the first part, 
discharged effluents into navigable waters. Ballard attempted to 
argue that since a finding that navigation has been impeded is 
necessary only for violation of the second part of section 13, and 
such a finding was made in the district court, the district court 
found a violation of only the second part. Although the court 
agreed with Ballard's interpretation of the section, it found the 
company guilty anyway. It viewed the lower court's impreciseness 
as nonprejudicial to Ballard. 
The question whether section 13 prohibits only those discharges 
which create impediments to navigation was posited more precisely 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
in United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co. of Puerto Rico,29 decided 
in 1967. Esso was charged with allowing oil to overflow its tanks 
and to run into a nearby waterway. The court held that Esso did 
not violate the second part of section 13, as there was "no sugges-
tion that navigation was impeded or obstructed."30 However, this 
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did not prevent the court from holding that Esso had violated the 
first part of the section, as Esso's actions constituted "indirect" 
discharges. Again, the issue was handled rather summarily. The 
court looked to Ballard Oil for support, as well as to an admonition 
in U.S. v. Republic Steel Corp., discussed below,31 that section 13 
not be given a "narrow, cramped reading."32 
A similar position was taken in 1971 by the United States Dis-
trict Court for Maine in United States v. Maplewood Poultry CO.33 
Although it had been stipulated that the litigated activity did not 
impede navigation, the court held that the prohibitions of the first 
part of section 13 were applicable: 
It has long since been authoritatively settled that the Act prohibits 
all discharges of polluting matter (other than sewage) into navigable 
waters, regardless of its source or continuing nature and irrespective 
of its effect upon navigation.34 
This court cited Ballard, Esso, and Republic Steel as authority. 
Not all courts, however, have regarded Ballard and its progeny 
as binding precedent. Several courts, looking to the wording of the 
entire section, its legislative history, and its placement within the 
broad framework of the Rivers and Harbors Act, have concluded 
that section 13 applies only to those discharges which tend to im-
pede the navigability of the waterways.35 Limiting section 13 in 
this manner, however, may not be correct, for reasons to be devel-
oped below.36 Nonetheless, the courts have viewed the permit pro-
visions of section 13 as an indication of a Congressional intent to 
prohibit only those discharges which are injurious to navigation.37 
The legislative history of section 13 supports such a conclusion. 
As noted above, this section was based on prior acts which either 
explicitly provided that they were applicable only to discharges 
obstructing navigation,38 or were interpreted to imply as much.39 
Since the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act indicate that Congress intended to make no substan-
tive changes in the then existing law,40 some persons may argue that 
the provisions of section 13 cannot be reasonably read as applicable 
to all discharges, regardless of their effects on navigationY 
Additional support for the proposition that section 13 prohibits 
only those discharges which impede navigation, may come from 
the very inclusion of section 13 within the framework of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act. Every other provision of the Act either regulates 
or prohibits activities potentially destructive of navigation. Since 
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section 13 is a part of this broader framework, it may, arguably, 
be subject to the same limitation. 
Whether section 13 applies only to those activities which impede 
navigation has not been directly decided by the Supreme Court. 
In United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,42 decided in 1960, the 
question before the Court was the scope of the exception to section 
13 for matter "flowing from streets and sewers and passing there-
from in a liquid state." The Court held that the exception is lim-
ited to "sewage" and does not apply to industrial wastes.43 The 
Court did not discuss the question whether it is necessary that 
the industrial wastes also impede navigation. However, it is clear 
from the record that the litigated activity in Republic Steel did 
impede navigation,44 as the defendant was also charged with a viola-
tion of section 10,45 which prohibits creation of an obstruction in 
a navigable waterway. 
As it is unclear whether the Court considered the existence of 
the obstruction to be necessary for a finding of a violation of sec-
tion 13, Republic Steel is open to two interpretations. To argue 
that a finding that navigation has been impeded is necessary, one 
might point to the existence of the obstruction in Republic Steel~ 
and maintain that the Court tacitly premised its decision on that 
existence. On the other hand, it might be asserted that since the 
Court made no express reference to the obstruction in its discussion 
of section 13, it deemed the obstruction to be utterly non-determi-
native of the section's applicability. The latter interpretation was 
imputed to the Court by the courts in ESS046 and Maplewood.47 
In U.S. v. Standard Oil CO.,48 decided by the Supreme Court in 
1966, the Court again left unanswered the question whether sec-
tion 13 prohibits only that activity which impedes navigation. The 
Court held that commercially valuable oil is within the meaning 
of "refuse" in section 13, and its discharge into a waterway without 
a permit is therefore prohibited.49 The Court found support for 
its holding in the broad range of substances that the earlier Rivers 
and Harbors Acts had prohibited: 
It is plain from [the Act's] legislative history that the "serious injury" 
to our watercourses (S. Rep. No. 224, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2) 
sought to be remedied was caused in part by obstacles that impeded 
navigation and in part by pollution.50 (emphasis added) 
However, as in Republic Steel, the existence of an obstruction in 
Standard Oil is indicated in the record. The Court noted that oil's 
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"presence in our rivers and harbors is both a menace to navigation 
and a pollutant."51 (Emphasis added.) Therefore, like Republic 
Steel, Standard Oil is also open to two interpretations. The Court's 
holding may be read as being limited to an interpretation of the 
word "refuse" in section 13, leaving undisturbed the requirement 
that the refuse impede navigation. But in view of the strong lan-
guage in the opinion that the section applies to both obstacles and 
pollution, the limited interpretation appears incorrect. As in Bal-
lard Oil, the existence of the obstruction in Standard Oil should be 
considered non-determinative of the question whether section 13 
has been violated. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the 
Court in Standard Oil did cite Ballard Oil as support for its hold-
ing that commercial oil is refuse,52 although the Court made no 
mention of the Ballard Oil holding that an obstruction to naviga-
tion is not necessary for a violation of section 13. 
To date, the broad interpretation of section 13, that all dis-
charges of refuse without a permit are prohibited, has been applied 
only in cases where the federal government was plaintiff.53 A more 
restrictive reading, that only discharges impeding navigation vio-
late section 13, has been applied where private parties have sought 
relief. 54 The courts' more restrictive reading is consistent with the 
traditional administrative interpretation of section 13; paradoxi-
cally, it may be noted that this interpretation was formulated with 
reference to the public character of the rights involved. An excerpt 
from the Corps of Engineers Regulations is illustrative: 
Section 13 ... prohibits the deposit in navigable waters generally 
of "refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than 
that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a 
liquid state." The jurisdiction of the Department of the Army, 
derived from the Federal laws enacted for the waters of the United 
States, is limited and directed to such control as may be necessary 
to protect the public right of navigation. Action under section 13 
has therefore been directed by the Department principally against 
the discharge of those materials that are obstructive or injurious to 
navigation. 55 
The Supreme Court has stated that as a general proposition it gives 
such administrative construction "great weight,"56 and at least one 
district court has considered this interpretation to be an important 
factor in limiting the scope of section 13.57 
However, it is no longer certain whether this administrative in-
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terpretation will continue to be followed even by the very organiza-
tion responsible for its promulgation. A more recent regulation58 
by the Corps of Engineers implements the program authorized by 
the Executive Order 11574,59 in which President Nixon ordered 
the creation of a permit program, based on section 13, to regulate 
the discharges of "pollutants"60 into navigable waters. The Execu-
tive Order requires that prior to issuance of a permit under section 
13, consideration be given to compliance with water quality stan-
dards. This regulation does not supersede the previous one, as the 
former relates to the Corps' litigation policy, and the latter to the 
permit procedure. However, it may be taken as an indication that 
the Corps is now of the view that section 13 admits of a broader 
application. If issuance of a permit is to require more than a show-
ing of noninterference with navigation, then the section must be 
interpreted as applying to more than just impediments or obstruc-
tions, i.e., to pollution in general. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit evinced 
similar reasoning in 1970 in Zabel v. Tabb. 61 In that case the court 
was concerned, not with section 13, but with an application for a 
dredge and fill permit, required by section 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act. The Secretary of the Army denied the permit for the 
reason that the project would harm the fish and wildlife resources 
of the bay in question. The denial was made despite the fact that 
the Secretary had determined that the project would not obstruct 
navigation. The district court,62 however, overturning the Secre-
tary's decision and ordering him to issue a permit, held that: 
Section 10 . . . does not vest the Secretary of the Anny with dis-
cretionary authority to deny an application for a dredge and fill 
permit thereunder when he has found factually that the construction 
proposed under the application would not interfere with navi-
gation.63 
But on appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the terms 
of the Act do not require that the reasons for non issuance of a per-
mit be related to navigability.64 Zabel v. Tabb thus indicates that 
the Corps of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army need no 
longer consider themselves bound by the earlier constricted inter-
pretations of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Although Zabel was con-
cerned with section 10, the court's reasoning should apply with 
equal force to section 13. Notwithstanding the fact that section 10 
refers only to "obstructions to navigation,"65 the court was able to 
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give that section a broader reading. Since the first part of section 13 
is not qualified by any reference to obstructions, it should be even 
easier for a court to give that section a capacious interpretation. 
To summarize, the long standing view that section 13 makes 
unlawful only that activity which interferes with navigation may 
be coming into disfavor. It may be reasonably argued that the 
Supreme Court, in Standard Oil, took a less restrictive view of what 
the section's purposes are. In addition, the agency responsible for 
the section's enforcement may itself no longer apply the strict 
traditional interpretation to that section. However, until the Su-
preme Court clearly enunciates its position, many lower courts will 
continue to adhere to earlier doctrine. 
REMEDIES TO ENFORCE THE REFUSE ACT 
Section 1766 of the Rivers and Harbors Act authorizes the De-
partment of Justice to conduct the legal proceedings necessary to 
enforce the provisions of several of the sections of the Act, includ-
ing section 13. Section 17 provides: 
The Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings 
necessary to enforce the provisions of sections ... [9, [0, 13, 14, and 
15] of this title; and it shall be the duty of the United States 
attorneys to vigorously prosecute all offenders against the same 
whenever requested to do so by the Secretary of the Army or by 
any of the officials hereinafter designated.67 
Violation of section 13 is made a misdemeanor by section 16 of the 
Act, which provides: 
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall 
knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provi-
sions of sections ... [13, 14, and 15] of this title shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a 
fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment 
(in the case of a natural person) for not less than thirty days nor 
more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the 
discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to be paid to the person 
or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction.68 
Read together, sections 16 and 17 indicate that section 13 was 
meant to define a criminal violation, and such a reading has been 
accepted by the courts.69 
However, criminal sanctions are not the most effective method 
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to protect navigable waterways. The Federal government has often 
sought injunctive relief against violations of the Act. Yet the courts 
are generally disinclined to permit the use of the injunction as a 
crime-prevention technique.70 Notwithstanding such disinclination, 
however, courts have on occasion granted injunctions, e.g., when 
there is a specific statutory grant of such power.71 Where such 
authorization is found, the court will issue the injunction upon a 
showing that the crime has occurred or is likely to occur.72 
It is clear that no express grant of injunctive relief is made by 
either of sections 13, 16, or 17. Nonetheless, the courts have im-
plied the remedy from the wording and purpose of these sections. 
For example, injunctive relief against section 10 violations was 
found to be an appropriate remedy in Republic Steel.73 The Court 
indicated that: 
Section lO of the present Act defines the interest of the United 
States which the injunction serves ... Congress has legislated and 
made its purpose clear; it has provided enough federal law in section 
10 from which appropriate remedies may be fashioned even though 
they rest on inferences. Otherwise we impute to Congress a futility 
inconsistent with the great design of this legislation.74 
Another case that adopts this position is Wyandotte v. United 
States.75 There the government sought compensation for the cost 
of raising a barge that had been negligently sunk in the Mississippi 
in violation of section 15.76 The owner of the barge maintained 
that the criminal penalties provided by section 1677 were exclusive 
of other remedies. To buttress this argument, it compared section 
12/8 which expressly authorizes injunctions to require removal of 
structures erected in violation of section 10 and which has been 
interpreted as authorizing the injunctive remedy for all violations 
of section 10, with section 16, which makes no express authoriza-
tion regarding injunctions. The absence of such an expression, 
Wyandotte asserted, reflects a congressional intent not to permit 
injunctive relief via this section. 
The Court, however, disagreed. It ascribed to Congress an intent 
consistent with the purpose of the Statute, and found that it would 
be unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended the statutory 
remedies to be exclusive of others. As to what other remedies 
are available, the Court noted the general rule that the United 
States may sue to protect its interests. Since the Act creates in the 
government an authority to prevent obstructions of the nation's 
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waterways, the government is, of course, entitled to take action 
that is in accord with its authority. In view of the fact that the 
criminal penalties of section 16 are inadequate, the Court held that 
other, civil relief may be appropriate.79 
Although Wyandotte involved a violation of section 15, the 
Court's reasoning, that the purpose of the Act be given primacy, 
should be applicable to section 13. Since section 16 provides the 
penalties for violations of several sections, thirteen as well as fifteen, 
the Court's refusal to construe the criminal penalties of section 16 
as precluding noncriminal remedies opens the way for use of a civil 
remedy for violations of section 13. 
While such a construction may be more readily applied where 
the United States is plaintiff, there is language in Wyandotte which 
permits the inference that other, non-governmental plaintiffs may 
also seek injunctive relief under the Act. First, in view of the over-
riding purpose of the Act, the Court was unwilling to read section 
16 as exclusive of other remedies. Otherwise, the Court held,80 the 
remedies to enforce the Act would often be inadequate. A similar 
argument can be made with respect to section 17, which authorizes 
the Department of Justice to institute legal proceedings for enforce-
ment under the Act. If section 17 is interpreted as excluding pri-
vate parties as plaintiffs, then there may be an inadequate number 
of possible plaintiffs (specifically one-the federal government) to 
enforce the Act. And if criminal enforcement is inadequate to the 
needs of the United States, it may be no less indequate to the needs 
of a private citizen. Second, the Wyandotte Court upheld the gov-
ernment's right to relief because the government was one of the 
parties whose interests the Act was intended to protect: "And we 
have found that a principal beneficiary of the Act, if not the princi-
pal beneficiary, is the government itself."81 Thus, the Court seems 
to acknowledge the possibility that parties other than the govern-
ment may have interests protected by the Act. 
Since it now appears that the United States may be granted 
injunctions against violations of section 13,82 it is necessary to con-
sider whether other parties also may be granted such relief. 
STANDING OF PRIVATE PERSONS UNDER THE REFUSE ACT 
As the Court indicated in Wyandotte, the Act recognizes an 
interest of the government in navigation on waterways, and that 
interest is the basis for an implied remedy of injunctive relief. 
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Without such relief, the government could not adequately protect 
its interest. The Act does not expressly state that the interest in 
navigation on waterways is exclusively a governmental interest. 
Other, private, parties who use the waterways also have interests 
protected by the Act. The protection, moreover, is not merely 
incidental; it is direct. The particular kinds of private interests 
protected will be discussed below. At this point, however, it is 
important to note that nothing on the face of the Act precludes 
recognition of other persons having an interest similar to the gov-
ernment's. 
If, then, as logic permits, the Wyandotte reasoning is made ap-
plicable to all persons arguably having interests in navigable water-
ways, these persons should be entitled, as is the government, to seek 
injunctions against violators of the Act. It was noted above that 
Wyandotte itself contains language suggestive of such a conclusion. 
There, the Court held that the government, as "a principal benefi-
ciary-if not the principal beneficiary"83 of the Act, was entitled to 
seek a civil remedy. 
This recognition of an expansive zone of interests to be protected 
by a statute is not unprecedented. For example, it has long been 
a commonly accepted rule in tort law that a member of a class, for 
whose benefit a statute was intended, may base his claim for relief 
upon a violation of that statute, even though the statute does not 
expressly provide for a private remedy. This rule frequently arises 
with respect to issues of negligence per se, where a prima facie case 
of negligence is established merely by proving the statute in ques-
tion has been violated.84 Significantly, private plaintiffs have for 
many years been able to base some actions, in at least some measure 
on the Rivers and Harbors Act. For example, it has been held that 
violation of the Act gives rise to a presumption of negligence in 
admiralty actions.85 Several courts have held that while such a cause 
of action is not expressly provided for in the Act, it is clearly im-
plied.86 In admiralty, the courts view the Act as intended for the 
benefit of private parties, even though the prohibitions of the Act 
are criminal in nature.87 Plaintiffs in state courts have made similar 
arguments, and at least one state court has taken the view that viola-
tion of the Act is negligence per se.88 
A number of recent Supreme Court decisions have acknowledged 
interests of private parties who are injured as a result of an admin-
istrator's nonenforcement of regulatory statutes.89 Even in the ab-
sence of specific statutory standing provisions, the Court has 
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permitted such parties to seek judicial redress for their grievances.9o 
The test for standing was set out in the seminal case of Association 
of Data Processing v. Camp: 
The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged 
action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise .... 
[the second] question is whether the interest sought to be protected 
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.91 
As to the Refuse Act, at least two district courts have stated that 
injunctive relief is, by implication, available to private parties who 
are injured by violation of the Act.92 In order to avail themselves of 
such relief, private plaintiffs must of course meet both of the stand-
ing criteria, set forth in Data Processing; in this context, the criteria 
are that they use the nation's waterways for purposes of naviga-
tion,93 and that they suffer injury because of interference there-
with.94 It may be noted that if a court were willing to ascribe an 
even broader purpose to section 13 (e.g., the maintenance of water 
quality by restricting polluters' discharges) the class of persons 
having interests thereby protected would obviously be expanded; 
this broader class could include swimmers, fishermen, and others 
who use the waters-and not just those who are navigators on the 
waterways. The prevailing view, however, has been that persons 
seeking relief for violations of section 13 must place themselves 
within the confines of the more narrowly defined class set out 
above.95 The case law on section 13 does not specify precise stan-
dards for determining whether a prospective plaintiff has satisfied 
the two criteria-being a navigator on waterways, and bearing 
injury because of interference therewith. Yet it is possible to take 
guidance from cases that have treated other sections of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act. For purposes of this discussion, these cases will 
be divided into two categories: those helpful with regard to the 
first requirement, that the private plaintiff be a "navigator," and 
those helpful with regard to the second requirement, that his navi-
gational interest be injured. 
"Navigator" Status 
Since the Rivers and Harbors Act is an exercise of the Congres-
sional power to regulate commerce,96 the clearest case of a plaintiff's 
meeting the "navigator" status required for standing is the com-
mercial user. For example, in Neches Canal Co. v. Miller and Vidal 
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Lumber CO.,97 involving construction of a dam in violation of sec-
tion 9 of the Act, the plaintiff that sought injunction of this ob-
struction was a lumber company which used the stream to float logs 
to the mill. The injunction was granted, because the court found: 
The lumber company, being the user of the navigable stream which 
was obstructed in violation of the statute, was a beneficiary of the 
statute forbidding its obstruction ... 98 
Here, the plaintiff was involved in active navigation of the stream, 
and it could show that the existence of a physical obstruction to 
this navigation injured him economically. 
There is no express statutory basis for distinguishing between 
the commercial navigator and the navigator who uses waterways 
for pleasure purposes. The navigable waterways are open to all, 
and in enforcing the provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act, the 
Corps of Engineers also has not differentiated the commercial 
from the non-commercial. The Act has, in fact, been invoked in 
situations where the only navigation affected was that of pleasure 
craft having no commercial purpose.99 Plaintiffs who navigate on 
waterways merely for reasons of pleasure should therefore also have 
standing to seek relief under section 13, the Refuse Act. 
A difficulty arises in determining whether a party who is not 
actively engaged in navigation of the waterways is nonetheless using 
the waterways for a purpose that is so connected with navigation 
as to place him within "navigator" status. For example, in H. 
Christiansen & Sons Inc. v. City of Duluth,100 decided in 1946, a 
defendant dock owner permitted timbers to float loose from his 
dock, in violation of section 13. The plaintiff was maintaining facil-
ities for those engaged in navigation, although he himself was not 
similarly engaged. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for 
relief on the grounds that he lacked standing to sue under the 
Act.101 The court did not discuss what relationship the litigated 
activity might have had to section thirteen's reference to "anchor-
age." Since the section provides that a permit may be issued unless 
the litigated activity impedes either navigation or anchorage, the 
section should be read as prohibiting both types of injuries. What 
effect this has on the determination of "navigator" status is unclear. 
Christiansen simply requires that the party be personally and ac-
tively involved in use of the waterways for navigational purposes. 
A similar result may obtain where a riparian landowner seeks 
to enjoin violations of section 13. The riparian landowner has a 
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clear potential for engaging in navigation activities. However, this 
potential, in and of itself, has not been sufficient to give riparian 
landowners "navigator" status.102 It seems clear then that the po-
tential plaintiff must establish actual navigational activity. Poten-
tial use, or probable future use, will not be sufficient. 
Demonstration of this actual navigational activity may involve 
little more than ownership of a boat. For example, in the 1963 
case of Tatum v. Blackstock/o3 the plaintiff sought to enjoin de-
fendants from filling in marshlands, in violation of section 9 of the 
Act. The plaintiff was a riparian landowner, whose property would 
be flooded and silted as a result of defendant's actions. It was partly 
as a result of the alleged damage to property that the court held 
that plaintiff was entitled to seek this relief. However, an additional 
and probably more important factor relied upon by the court was 
the fact that plaintiff owned a twenty-two foot boat, which he used 
for fishing and for pleasure purposes. The court held that this 
satisfied the test as set out in Neches,104 but it did not indicate the 
exact manner in which the plaintiff had suffered injury to his 
navigational activity. Apparently, the bare fact that the plaintiff 
was engaged in navigational activity and that this navigation in 
general was being obstructed was sufficient, although the court's 
holding in this regard is rather vague. 
Injury in Use of Navigable Waterways 
The second requirement, that there be an injury to plaintiff's 
navigation activities, is merely a corollary of the first requirement. 
If the Rivers and Harbors Act is intended to prevent injury only 
to navigation, then a plaintiff not engaged in navigation simply 
cannot suffer an injury that the Act was intended to prevent. Also 
in accordance with this hypothesis, a plaintiff engaged in naviga-
tion, but not suffering an injury to his navigational activity inter-
ests, cannot base his claim for relief under the Act on any other 
lllJunes. 
Again, it can be seen that such reasoning stems from a limited 
view of the purpose of the Act. If section 13 was truly intended to 
prevent a broad range of injuries to waterways, injuries not neces-
sarily limited to navigational interests, then any activity that 
would diminish the value of waterways, such as pollution activity, 
should give rise to a remedy under this section. Notwithstanding 
this possibility, however, the courts, consistent with the restricted 
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definition of the "navigator" status, have limited the types of injury 
actionable under section 13 to those occurring to navigation.lo5 
On these grounds, relief was denied to an organization of fisher-
men who without question were "navigators" but who had alleged 
as their injury the pollution of waterways and a resultant decrease 
in numbers of fish. lo6 Relief has also been denied to plaintiffs 
alleging such injuries as obstruction to access to land/o7 erosion 
damage to land/os or damage to dock109 or jettyYo In each of these 
cases, the plaintiff failed to connect an alleged violation of section 
13 with an interference to his navigational interest. 
That this difficulty exists is often due, in large measure, to the 
nature of the discharges involved. The effect of refuse matter on 
navigation is not always obvious or immediate. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that the mere presence of refuse matter in the waterways can 
have a deleterious effect on navigation. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized this fact with respect to some pollutants, such 
as industrial solids, which may form a barrier to navigation.11l The 
discharge of oil into waterways has also been recognized as an im-
pediment to navigation,l12 presumably because of its creation of a 
fire hazard.ll3 Thus, the fact that a particular type of refuse has 
not commonly been regarded as an "obstruction" to navigation 
need not preclude a finding that discharge of this refuse is an im-
pediment to navigation. 
In a similar fashion, less direct, but no less adverse, effects of 
discharges should also be regarded as bases for injunctive relief. 
For example, the added cost of removing a pollutant from the 
exterior or interior114 of boats should-since it would arguably im-
pede navigational activity-be grounds to have the polluting opera-
tions enjoined. Since the Rivers and Harbors Act is a Congressional 
exercise of the commerce power, the factor of additional cost, itself 
a burden on commerce, could be recognized by courts as an injury 
that the Act was intended to prevent. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, litigation by private plaintiffs under the Refuse Act 
has been unavailing. Discernible now, however, is a trend to regard 
private litigation under the Act as being consonant with the Act's 
broadly expressed purpose. Private parties seeking relief under the 
Act may bolster their claims by citation to several recent cases con-
cerning the Refuse Act, as well as to other sections of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act. 
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No longer is it widely accepted by the courts that the Refuse Act 
applies only to activity that impedes navigation. In several recent 
suits, the federal government has been successful in gaining injunc-
tions against pollution activities that are violative of the act, even 
though such activities have had no apparent effect on navigation. 
Moreover, the Corps of Engineers, in its permit program under 
the Act, has now specifically provided for consideration of other 
criteria besides effect upon navigation. Since the meaning of the 
Refuse Act cannot vary merely according to the public or private 
character of the plaintiffs litigating thereunder, those cases deny-
ing relief to private parties for reason that the Act applies only to 
navigational impediments are logically suspect. 
The availability of injunctive relief for violations of the Refuse 
Act has now been firmly established. This remedy has been applied 
in order to advance the Act's primary purpose, prevention of ob-
structions to navigation and/or pollution. While thus far the only 
successful plaintiff in this regard has been the federal government, 
the same policy arguments which have allowed it to win injunctive 
relief should apply with equal force to the private litigant. To 
argue that the penal character of the Act precludes injunctive relief 
to private parties is to disregard the fact that equitable remedies 
have already been accorded to the federal government. 
A major question remains as to the forms of injury to which 
injunctive relief will extend. Broad guidelines have already been 
established by the Supreme Court, in connection with its recent 
decisions on standing, and by lower courts, even in cases refusing 
relief to private parties. The general rule, that a plaintiff must 
suffer an injury in fact and that he must have an interest within 
the zone of interest protected by the statute, would mean, when 
applied to the Refuse Act, that the private plaintiff suffer injury 
in a water-use context and that he have established water-use inter-
ests. To the extent that this application relates only to activity that 
is injurious to navigation, it is erroneously restrictive. The Act 
admits of claims and remedies not only to navigational interference 
but also to pollution activity. A private litigant, as well as the fed-
eral government, should be able to have such pollution enjoined. 
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